Richard Cornwell
Head, Operational African Security Information Service (OASIS) Institute for Security Studies
Published in African Security Review Vol 7, No. 3, 1998

REVERSING HISTORY ? AN APPEAL FOR RECOLONISATION

On 3 August 1997, some 7 000 protesters on the Comoran island of Anjouan marched on the governor's palace in the principal town, Mutsamudu, to press their demands for independence. After tearing down and destroying the Comoran flag, they hoisted the French tricolour and the flag of the last sultan of independent Anjouan. An independence declaration signed by the leader of the Anjouan People's Movement, Foundi Abdallah Ibrahim, a 75-year old Koranic teacher, included an appeal to France to hear the cries of distress issuing from Anjouan. This latest in a series of demonstrations had evidently been arranged in response to an appeal by Comores president Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim for proposals to address what had been a simmering constitutional crisis over the rights and privileges of the three islands comprising the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comores. Subsequently, the protesters established barricades in the streets of the town and declared that Anjouan was 'officially reattached' to France. Almost unnoticed, secessionists on the smallest of the Comoran islands, Mohéli, declared that they were following Anjouan's lead.

Comores

The attempted secession and the implicit appeal to France to restore its authority over its erstwhile colonial possession were embarrassing, not only to the Comoran government, but to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and to Paris. On 4 August, the OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, appealed for calm on the islands and said he would send a special envoy to talk to the government and the secessionists in an attempt to defuse the crisis and help create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue and national reconciliation. He emphasised the OAU's commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Comores, in accordance with the Organisation's founding principles as expressed in its Charter. He also hinted at the difficulties confronting an impoverished and remote microstate: "Any division can only cause further sufferings for the people of the Comores and would not be in the short and long term interests of all the Comoran people." Salim subsequently appointed Pierre Yere, the Ivory Coast's Ambassador to the OAU, as his special envoy.

For Paris, too, the developments on Anjouan and Mohéli were anything but welcome, since they focused international attention on a regional anomaly. France's continued administration of the nearby island of Mayotte, which had been ruled as part of the Comores prior to 1975, has long been a matter of dispute with the Comoran government, which seeks the integration of Mayotte into the Republic. This demand receives regular support in the OAU and the United Nations. The inhabitants of Mayotte, however, enjoy many material benefits as a result of their island's status as a French dependency: free education, health care, a minimum wage and family allowances. A few years ago, Jacques Chirac as prime minister of France, announced a US $145 million development programme for Mayotte. In their complaints against the Comoran government, the Anjouanais secessionists greatly emphasised their own exposure to increasing poverty and political unrest since three-quarters of the archipelago became independent in 1975. Paris, in the throes of scaling down its military presence in Africa, associated itself firmly with the OAU's line on the Anjouan crisis. Even before Anjouan's unilateral declaration of 3 August, France had stated clearly that it condemned any attempt at secession and expressed its hope that the solutions to the island's social and economic problems would come through dialogue based on an acceptance of the territorial integrity of the Comores Republic.

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Before we pursue the course of diplomatic and political wrangling further, it would be advisable to take stock of the socio-economic situation in the Comores and its troubled political history since independence. Not only will this help to explain the origins of the current crisis, it will also suggest the likely parameters, and possibly even the germ of a resolution to the immediate difficulty. This is an important issue, because even though the Comores Republic is remote and weak in comparison to other member states of the OAU, the attempted secession poses a problem of fundamental importance to the Organisation that is out of all proportion to the islands' continental significance. It also constitutes a direct challenge to the OAU's will and capacity to act within the African context: one that, given the relative weakness of the Comores, eventually might tempt the OAU to consider a response more forceful than it would be likely to entertain in other circumstances.

The Comoran archipelago, situated at the north end of the Mozambique Channel, consists of four main islands: Grand Comore (Njazidja in Swahili) 1 148 square kilometres; Anjouan (Nzwani) 424 square kilometres; Mohéli

(Mwali) 290 square kilometres; and Mayotte (Mahoré) 376 square kilometres. The first three islands comprise the Republic of Comores and have a total population of some 560 000, of whom some 300 000 inhabit Grand Comore, 230 000 Anjouan, and 30 000 Mohéli. French-ruled Mayotte has a population of about 100 000.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL RESUME

France extended its rule over the Comores from the mid-19th century, acquiring Mayotte from Madagascar in 1841, and extending a protectorate over the other three islands in 1886. In 1908, the islands were incorporated in Madagascar, a French colony, and a local Comoran colonial administration, based in Mayotte, was created in 1912. Although French rule brought an end to the institution of slavery and saw an improvement in health standards, plantation cash crops were developed at the expense of the islands' food supply, and few of the resulting economic benefits remained with the islands. In 1946, the Comores became an overseas department of France, represented in the National Assembly, and the following year its administrative ties to Madagascar were severed.

In a referendum held in 1958, the vast majority of Comorans voted to remain part of France, and three years later the islands were made self-governing. Local politics and the economy were dominated by the Shirazi élite, whose forebears had ruled the islands as sultans prior to the arrival of the French. The local politicians were largely concerned with improving a profitable relationship with France and securing assistance for the development of local infrastructure and services. In the early 1960s, an independence movement sprang up, not in the Comores itself, but among expatriates living in Tanganyika. It was some five years before this movement began to obtain a slender toehold in the archipelago where, encouraged by the radical signals coming from the African mainland, they persuaded many of the conservative political élite that independence was at the very least a regrettable necessity. Following a brief period of sometimes violent agitation, a referendum on the Comores' future was held in December 1974. On the islands of Grand Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli, the result was a 95 per cent majority for independence; on Mayotte 65 per cent voted for departmental status within France.

The vote on Mayotte has some echoes in the Anjouan secession of 1997, for the political organisation against independence in 1974 was orchestrated by shopkeepers adversely affected by the move of the colonial capital in 1962 from Mayotte to Moroni, the principal town of Grand Comore. There was also an appeal to cultural sensibilities - the longer association with France and the subsequent Creolisation and Christianisation of much of the Mahorian population - but chief among the deciding factors was that Mayotte had more natural resources and a smaller population, and so thought it more likely that independence would condemn its people to share the poverty of the other three islands.

In June 1975, the French government decided that the island-by-island plebiscite had been inconclusive and to postpone independence until a second referendum had been held at the end of the year. The local Comoran government, led by Ahmed Abdallah, responded on 6 July 1975 by declaring the Comores an independent republic under Abdallah's presidency. France then cut off all aid, which accounted for 41 per cent of the Comores budget, and sent military and naval reinforcements to Mayotte. In November 1975, the UN granted Comores membership and recognised its claims to Mayotte, against French opposition.

Though Mayotte provided France with an important naval facility in the Indian Ocean, unlike the French departement of Réunion to the north-east of Madagascar, Paris gently resisted Mahorais attempts to acquire full departmental status, and created the classification of territorial community (collectivité territoriale) for Mayotte. Instead, once friendly governments had been installed in Comores, France seemed willing, even eager, to coax its aspirant citizens towards reintegration with the independent Republic, particularly after the latter had introduced a federalist constitution in 1978. Comoran agitation over Mayotte has since been tempered by the Republic's growing dependence upon France for assistance and protection. Meanwhile, however, Mahorais resistance to incorporation in the Republic of Comores has grown ever stronger with a satisfaction born of relative economic prosperity and political stability - a favoured local slogan is "we shall remain French to remain free." That Anjouan is the closest of the other islands, with a significant emigrant population on Mayotte, has obviously played its part in the present imbroglio.

'THE FRIGHTENERS'

The short history of the independent Republic of Comores has not been a particularly happy one. Abdallah's first presidency lasted only three weeks before he was deposed in a mercenary-assisted coup, which possibly enjoyed the support of French commercial interests. He fled Grand Comore for his political power base, Anjouan, but two months later was arrested and sent into exile. At the end of 1975, France recognised Comores' independence, but aid programmes remained suspended. Abdallah was eventually succeeded as head of state by Ali Soilih, whose brief term was marked by hostility towards France, particularly after February 1996, when Mayotte voted by a majority of 99,4 per cent in favour of continued French rule. Soilih also introduced a programme of radical domestic reforms, aimed at breaking French influence and the hold of traditional values. Not only did these policies condemn the new state to penury, in the absence of French subsidies, but his agenda constituted a direct threat to the influence of conservative religious leaders and established local interest groups. A number of coup plots were uncovered as Soilih's rule became ever more unpopular and repressive and, in May 1978, he was overthrown by a force of fifty mercenaries led by Bob Denard. Shortly afterwards, Abdallah, who had helped finance the successful coup, resumed office.

Abdallah's relations with France now became more cordial. A new constitution promulgated in 1978 granted each of the three islands its own legislature and control over the taxes levied on resident individuals and businesses. It also included sweeping presidential powers, which Abdallah used to introduce a twelve-year ban on political parties. The president now set about to entrench his power, and to augment his personal fortune, with the assistance of his mercenary associates, who trained and led a 300-strong presidential guard. It was also at this time that the Comores, through Denard, became an important link in South African arms sales to Iran and supply to the Mozambican rebel movement RENAMO. Abdallah's increasing wealth, his political dominance and the favoured status of his foreign-led and South African-financed guard, known locally as les affreux - 'the frighteners' - all contributed to popular resentment against his rule, though the opposition remained fractured by the chronic factionalism and shifting pattern of personal alliances that has been the hallmark of Comoran politics.

In 1989, Abdallah changed the constitution to allow himself a third term in office. He had made a fatal mistake, however, in his dealings with his protectors. Under pressure from France and South Africa, whose reform-minded government was now embarrassed by the excesses of the presidential guard, Abdallah sought to dispense with the services of Denard, and incorporate his special unit into the armed forces. When the President's intentions became known on the night of 26/27 November 1989, an argument evidently ensued in the course of which he was shot and killed. Two days later the presidential guard seized power, ousted the provisional president and installed, in his stead, the newly appointed chief of the supreme court, Mohamed Said Djohar. France and South Africa now cut off all aid to the islands and, in mid-December, Denard surrendered in exchange for safe passage for himself and his lieutenants to South Africa. In 1993, Denard returned to France, where legal moves against him were eventually abandoned.

A provisional government of national unity was formed and, after considerable manipulation of the election schedule and vote, Djohar eventually emerged in March 1990 as the victor in the second round of presidential contest by 55 per cent to Mohamed Taki's 45 per cent. Djohar's presidency was marked by repeated and sudden shifts in policy and political alliances, including numerous cabinet reshuffles as he struggled to maintain a working majority. Against this background there was no serious attempt to address the Comores' dire economic and development problems. Public disillusionment, an attempted mutiny and various rumours of coup plots were once again the staple fare of Comoran political life. Then in September 1995, Bob Denard unexpectedly reappeared on the scene, at the head of a small force of mercenary invaders. Paris intervened militarily to thwart the putsch, though there were some who maintained that Denard had been acting in conjunction with elements in the French intelligence services. Djohar was restored, but only as titular president until new elections could be held. These were won on the second round by Mohamed Taki.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

Before proceeding to examine the methods by which President Taki sought to consolidate his authority, we should look at the magnitude of the economic and social problems confronting his administration.

The Republic of the Comores is extremely poor. Gross national product in 1996 was estimated at only US $460 per capita. The islands' economic development has been hampered by their geographical isolation, small domestic market and their distance from each other: Grand Comore is forty kilometres from Mohéli, eighty kilometres from Anjouan, and 200 kilometres from Mayotte. Comores has no minerals or other high-value raw materials and is the most narrowly based of all the East African island economies, being dependent on a small range of export crops, of which the world price fluctuates wildly but has trended steadily downwards in recent years: vanilla, ylang-ylang, cloves and copra. Exports in 1996 were valued at only US $6,5 million. In such a narrowly based trading and aid-dependent economy, there is very little for foreign investors to consider financing. Attempts to develop a high-value tourist market have been adversely affected by the islands' reputation for political instability, particularly since the invasion of 1995 and now the Anjouan crisis.

The dependence upon cash crops for export has reduced the already limited amount of land available for growing food, and Comores imports most of its staple, rice. Less than fifty per cent of the islands' surface area is suitable for farming, much of the terrain being mountainous. In Africa, the islands' ratio of 400 people per hectare of arable land is exceeded only by Egypt and Rwanda, and the natural environment is under serious threat. The clearance of natural forest had reduced the total from 31 000 hectares in 1950 to 8 000 in the 1990s, and this has resulted in serious erosion, given the hilly nature of the landscape. Even this high rate of deforestation has failed to keep pace with an annual population growth in excess of 3,6 per cent, however: in 1965, there was 0,4 hectare of arable land per person; by 1990 this had fallen to 0,18 hectare. The continued overuse of available land leads to a steady decline in its fertility, and a continuation of the vicious circle. In an effort to find some other means of subsistence, many people flock towards the towns setting up informal and unplanned settlements which have created a serious pollution problems and a threat to the islands' meagre natural water resources. Of all the islands, Anjouan is by far the worst affected by overcrowding.

TIME FOR A BREAK?

The secessionist movement on Anjouan seems to have begun in 1995, when a tiny group of Comoran veterans of the French Army called for independence of the island. Little seems to have come of this movement until the following year, however, when President Taki, true to the example set by his predecessors, sought to consolidate his grip on the precarious heights of power by amending the Constitution. The revisions were approved in a referendum in October 1996, though the exercise was boycotted by the opposition. The new Constitution retained the principles of multiparty democracy and free speech, but significantly increased the powers of the president and reduced the scope for opposition parties to evolve or for individual islands to develop their own policies within the federal framework. Presidents were no longer limited to two terms in office, and they alone had the right to propose changes to the Constitution. Islands lost the right to elect their own governors, and the senate, a body supposed to represent islands' interests but not actually set up, was scrapped. Deputies from an island might vote en bloc to veto legislation that they saw as prejudicial to their island's interests, but the president might choose to override this veto. These changes angered many of the residents of Anjouan and Mohéli, aggravating long-felt feelings of deprivation. The opposition also boycotted the parliamentary elections in December 1996, leaving Taki with a commanding majority, although only some twenty per cent of the electorate bothered to vote.

By 1997, Taki's increasingly authoritarian leadership style, and the noticeable decline in living standards had made the government fairly unpopular throughout the islands. At the end of January, civil servants took to the streets in the capital, Moroni, to protest that their salaries were ten months in arrears; troops and gendarmes wounded fifteen of the demonstrators. In mid-February, a general strike closed down businesses in the islands despite government warnings. It was against this background that the secessionists on Anjouan and Mohéli began to make their presence felt. On 14 March, four people were killed and another twenty wounded on Anjouan where a general strike had led to the storming of the airport and the erection of barricades in defiance of the authorities. Hundreds were subsequently detained and there were widespread allegations of torture as Moroni sent in troop reinforcements. Harassment and defiance followed upon each other, and another two demonstrators were killed by security forces on 14 July when they tried to raise the French flag on Bastille Day. It was the bitterness in Anjouan about being treated as an occupied territory that seems to have shifted the balance decisively in favour of secession and against negotiation.

YERE IN, YERE OUT

When Salim Ahmed Salim's special envoy to the Comores, Pierre Yere, arrived on the islands for his first exploratory talks on 8 August, the representatives of the Anjouan revolt, headed by 'President' Abdallah Ibrahim, told him that their actions had been precipitated by years of neglect by the central government. They denounced Taki's constitutional reforms as entrenching a centralised presidential system that made a mockery of the idea of federation. The deaths in confrontations with the security forces had confirmed their belief that the authorities in Grand Comore were not interested in dialogue. From Mohéli, where the authorities had dispersed secessionist demonstrators, but failed to prevent the election of Said Mohammed Souef as 'president' of a self-proclaimed independent state, came similar complaints of neglect and economic marginalisation. President Taki's reaction to the OAU representative was to reject the arguments of the secessionists as unfounded, but to offer a greater degree of autonomy to the islands, including the right to elect their own governors and to have some control over their finances. The authorities in Moroni also denied that they would make any attempt to intervene militarily on the two rebel islands. Before his mission ended on 16 August, Yere appeared to have secured the agreement of all parties on the institution of a settlement plan to include an international conference on the Comores, the deployment of OAU military observers and the organisation of a Round Table of Donors to mobilise the necessary resources for development. The secessionists were obviously unhappy, however, with the OAU's insistence on respect for the integrity of the Comores, nor was the point lost on them that Salim's mother had been born on Grand Comore. Anjouan also demanded that Comoran forces not native to the island should be withdrawn prior to any negotiations.

On 22 August 1997, the OAU's Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution met at ambassadorial level to consider developments in the Comores. It decided that the proposed conference on the situation should be held in Addis Ababa from 10 to 17 September and should examine the political, institutional and socio-economic problems of Comores in their entirety. It also approved the deployment of an OAU observer mission, including twelve military personnel, and the enlistment of the support of the donor community to underpin any political settlement that might be reached.

On the basis of these decisions, Salim asked Yere to return to the islands on 30 August to make arrangements for the conference and for the deployment of the observers. In the meantime, however, the situation on the ground had

deteriorated: a detachment of gendarmerie on Anjouan had rallied to the secessionists and forced the governor's resignation, and the government offices had been seized by the secessionists. President Taki warned the Anjouanais of dire consequences should they continue in their chosen course, although government representatives assured Yere that no military action was considered. Anjouan was not convinced, however, and the locals began setting their defences in order.

MORONIC MANOEUVRES

Even as the OAU continued to urge a peaceful settlement to the crisis, the security forces on Grand Comore commandeered two ships and, on 3 September, launched an invasion of Anjouan. Moroni sought to justify the action by claiming that the latest actions of the secessionists constituted a challenge to the state that could not be ignored, and that the islanders needed protection from persons whose behaviour had degenerated into terrorism. It seems, however, that the invading force was ill-prepared for the task at hand. They evidently expected that they would merely have to clear barricades and road-blocks. Instead, they ran into a determined and well-directed resistance, and were compelled to withdraw on 5 September leaving some forty of their number dead and more than a hundred prisoners. A number of Anjouanais citizens also lost their lives in the fighting.

This development not only upset the timing of the OAU initiative, but confirmed suspicions among some of the secessionists that the Organisation was in no position to play the role of honest broker. The scale of the military disaster also presented President Taki with a new set of difficulties, further eroding his popularity, most dangerously in military circles, and strengthening the Anjouanais resolve to resist the threats and blandishments emanating from Moroni. Following this humiliation, which he blamed on the alleged presence of mercenary elements, and having received France's refusal to intervene, Taki again turned to the OAU. He also attempted to shore up his own position on 9 September by invoking Article 20 of the Constitution and dissolving the government, civil and military cabinets and state defence council. He assumed full powers for an initial period of three weeks and announced that a government of national unity would be formed once a state of normality had been established through the mediation efforts of the OAU and the Arab League. Taki's moves were rejected both by the secessionists and the principal opposition groupings on Grand

Comore: as far as they were concerned, the most positive step the president could take would be to resign. When President Taki appointed a transitional commission of state on 12 September, it consisted of his close associates and did nothing to broaden the base of his administration.

The OAU's Central Organ met again on 10 September. Having expressed grave concern about the course of events in Comores, which constituted a major setback to the OAU's mediation efforts, it urged Salim to talk with the parties concerned to reschedule the conference.

On 19 September, Yere began his third mission to the islands. An apparently chastened Taki assured the envoy of his determination to do everything possible to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis, and promised an amnesty for deeds committed by the secessionists. On their part, the Anjouanais negotiators' position had hardened: they accused the Comoran government of reneging on its previous undertakings and of inflicting severe human and material damage on their island. Discussions with Yere continued until 2 October, centring on the proposed conference in Addis, the release of the soldiers taken prisoner on Anjouan, and the deployment of the OAU observer mission on that island. The Comoran government urged that the observer mission's mandate be expanded and its numbers increased. In particular, it wanted the mission to ensure the safety of the local population, recover weapons now in civilian hands and secure the return of local gendarmerie and defence forces to the authority of the federal government. Under the prevailing circumstances, none of these requests seemed likely to be met. LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE?

Indeed, on 27 September Ibrahim Abdallah announced that his administration intended to hold a referendum before the conference was held to demonstrate the popular support for their actions. Yere expressed alarm, saying that such a step would seriously compromise his efforts to organise negotiations. The decision also seemed to have created division on the island, with some leaders complaining that it contradicted their undertakings to the OAU and the Arab League to seek a solution. Abdallah Ibrahim asked that the OAU conference be postponed until 10 November, and indicated to the Secretary General that the despatch of military observers to Anjouan would not be appropriate at present.

Salim's response on 8 October was that, were a referendum to be held on Anjouan, it would be contrary to the undertakings to co-operate in the OAU's efforts, and would compound the crisis. He appealed to Ibrahim Abdallah to rescind the decision. He was supported by the Central Organ, which indicated that it would refuse to recognise the result of such a plebiscite. A week later, the Taki government thanked the OAU for its efforts, but warned that, were the referendum to go ahead, not only would it undermine Comoran sovereignty, but it would jeopardise the process of dialogue and peace. Under these circumstances the Comoran government would refuse to participate in the Addis conference.

On 23 October Ibrahim Abdallah informed Salim that the referendum would proceed, since the representatives of Anjouan could only participate on an equal status with other delegations to the proposed conference once such a step had been taken. He also issued a scarcely veiled warning against any attempt to deploy OAU observers on the island. The referendum was indeed held on 26 October and, according to the local electoral commission, 94 per cent of the electorate cast their ballots, registering a 'Yes' vote of more than 99 per cent to the question "Do you want independence from the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comores?" Press reports remarked on the popular enthusiasm and holiday atmosphere of the occasion.

This development certainly placed the OAU in a difficult position, as it was doubtless intended to do. The Organisation immediately refused to acknowledge the result and reaffirmed its unflinching support for the territorial integrity of the Comores, adding that it was determined to do everything in its power to ensure this cardinal principle of the OAU. President Taki also made it clear that he expected the OAU to act in accordance with its words. On 29 October he wrote to Salim to express his commitment to a negotiated solution, but qualified this by adding "[we] rely on our Organisation to restore order, national unity and territorial integrity of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comores.

"In its meeting of 6 November, the OAU Central Organ also asked the Secretary General to consider appropriate measures to preserve Comoran unity. Four days later, Ambassador Yere was on his fourth mission to the islands. He failed to secure the agreement of the Anjouanais to the deployment of an OAU observer mission or to the demand that Anjouan be represented at the conference as a part of Comores. The Mohéli position was more accommodating and a small team of OAU observers had already begun to deploy on that island and on Grand Comore. FALSE HOPE?

The Addis conference eventually convened on 10 December. It was attended by 57 Comoran delegates, including eight from each of Anjouan and Mohéli, representatives of regional governments and of France. After three days of talks, agreement had been reached to convene an inter-island conference under OAU auspices to work out a mutually acceptable institutional framework. The final communiqué also recorded deep regret at the military action on Anjouan and Mohéli.

On 25 December, an OAU mission led by Said Djinnit, the Organisation's chief of cabinet, arrived in the Comores. It returned with the welcome news that all parties seemed committed to the arrangements agreed in Addis earlier in the month. Despite logistical problems experienced by the small OAU observer mission, matters seemed to be progressing satisfactorily, though some concern was expressed about the malign influence of elements in Mayotte and even France, which may have been attempting to bedevil the process.

There were also indications of divisions between elements in the Anjouan leadership, and fighting broke out on the island briefly in February 1998. Disagreement probably centred partly on personalities, but also on the steps to be taken towards consolidating the Anjouan position. At the end of February, a constitutional referendum was held, which would establish the island as a sovereign and democratic state. Salim reacted angrily to what he depicted as an escalation of the crisis and a mark of intransigence on the part of the secessionists. The OAU determined to send a ministerial delegation to the islands, comprising representatives from Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa and Burkina Faso. Undaunted, Ibrahim Abdallah announced the formation of a five-member government for Anjouan under the premiership of a blind ex-naval serviceman, Chamassi Said Omar in March.

Insult followed injury. The OAU ministerial delegation to the Comores abandoned its mission after three days on 21 March, when demonstrators in Anjouan's main town refused to allow them to meet the secessionist leadership until they had addressed a rally in the town square. The ministers refused to comply with this demand, which local leaders apparently intended as a test for the even-handedness of the OAU in the dispute and to show the popular mood. Leaving some of its members in Moroni to talk with the Comoran government, the mission returned to the African mainland. Questioned by reporters after the incident, Tanzanian foreign minister Jakaya Kikwete said that from what they had seen on Anjouan "there is anarchy and chaos and the situation is out of hand." The optimism of early January had now been replaced by speculation that the OAU, urged on by President Taki, might consider authorising a forceful intervention in the crisis. A meeting of the Central Organ on 1 April called on member states to weigh all possible options to ensure Comoran unity and territorial integrity.

In mid-April, in an attempt to ward off the possibility of armed intervention, the Anjouan secessionists put forward a proposal for the creation of a Union of Comores States. This would provide for the formation of a loose confederation, in which each island would have its own constitution, legal, financial and judicial powers. The proposals came very close to those advanced a few days earlier by the principal opposition in Grand Comore. WHAT NOW?

Unfortunately, events have taken an unfortunate turn since January, leading some of the protagonists to harden their positions. President Taki seems to have interpreted the abortive ministers' mission of April as a final chance for the Anjouan secessionists to accept a peaceful settlement. He now seems likely to agitate for more forceful action from the OAU, aware that more decisive measures will minimise the concessions he will be required to make. For political reasons, he also needs a clear victory to obliterate the memory of his own military setback.

The humiliation of the OAU delegation will not have improved the chances of the Anjouanais receiving a favourable hearing in Addis. Nor is it prudent for the secessionists to continue to taunt the OAU with its impotence or incompetence. This can only complicate matters and may tilt them in a direction that would lead to further tragedy. The adoption of rigid postures by the parties involved may persuade the OAU that the time for reasoned and patient diplomacy is past. Once extreme measures come into the frame, there is a tendency for responses to be less applicable to the crisis in hand.

Hopefully, cool heads will prevail. From the outset, the OAU has recognised that a military riposte to the Anjouan problem provides no solution, and that the underlying difficulty is a development and economic one. It has to be added, however, that the domestic political dimensions of the crisis remain to be addressed. President Taki is far from blameless in his eagerness to consolidate his rule, regardless of the damage this has done to the political fabric of the Republic. His early handling of the crisis was also responsible for unnecessary loss of life. Whether the OAU will be able to address this aspect of the problem is doubtful. The Organisation is essentially a club of heads of state, in which each member tends to expect the unconditional and unquestioning support of his fellows. Although many African conflicts owe their immediate origins to internal disputes and irresponsible leadership, the OAU is bound by the shibboleth of sovereignty, and tends to ignore the uncomfortable truth that it is sometimes required to act as gamekeeper at a convention of poachers.

In the constitutional engineering being suggested by the Comoran opposition and the secessionists, there would appear to be an opening for a settlement satisfactory to most parties. France is also evidently ready to re-examine the status of Mayotte and, providing that Mahorais objections can be met, some arrangement reuniting the Comoran archipelago might provide a more durable basis for economic development. That the assistance and advice of the outside world will remain an essential ingredient in Comores' future is not in doubt, however, and even with this in place, a comfortable future is far from assured.

Independence

For most of the 20th century the Comoros were left to the devices of the plantation companies, exploiting the islands' agricultural resources, in conjunction with the aristocratic descendants of the sultans (who had been forced to abdicate in the 1880s). Sugar cane made way for vanilla growing and later other scent-bearing crops were introduced. Many Comorians emigrated to Madagascar in search of better opportunities. In 1946 the Comoros were separated from Madagascar and in 1961 the colony was granted limited self-government. The capital was moved from Mayotte to Moroni, on Grande Comore, in 1962. Following unrest on the islands during campaigns for independence, France held a referendum on the issue in 1974. The overall vote in favour of independence was 96%, but on Mayotte 64% of the voters opposed termination of French rule.

The French attempted to solve the problem created by Mayotte, by offering increased autonomy to the islands — individually as well as collectively — as an alternative to independence. This was rejected by the independence movement. Differences between the French government and the Comorian leaders over the draft independence constitution further delayed independence. On 6 July 1975 the Comorian legislature voted a unilateral declaration of independence and the president of the governing council, Ahmed Abdallah, became president of the independent republic, which Mayotte refused to join. Less than a month later Abdallah was deposed by an alliance of conservative politicians who had become concerned about his handling of the Mayotte issue. Abdallah fled to Anjouan, his homeground. A band of French mercenaries, led by Bob Denard, who had previously been involved in several African trouble spots, was sent to arrest him. Abdallah was subsequently sent into exile. France recognized the Comoros Republic at the end of 1975, despite Comorian condemnation of the continued French presence on Mayotte, but withdrew all of its technical personnel and suspended financial assistance to the island state.

Thoroughly disillusioned with France, the Comorian Chamber of Deputies in January 1976 replaced Said Mohammed Djaffar (successor to Abdallah) with Ali Soilih, a rising star in the establishment and a man with radical reformist ideas. Soilih tried to counter Islamic influence and to eliminate revered customs, such as the grand mariage (see above). Having replaced what remained of the civil service with members of his youth movement, Soilih ran the state into the ground within 18 months. Denard and his mercenaries were called in again. In May 1978 they easily overthrew the regime and Soilih was killed when he later tried to escape from detention. The mercenaries left the country. The former president, Ahmed Abdallah, who had partially financed the coup, was again elected president. Islam was declared the state religion and, to lure Mayotte into the republic, a new constitution with federal features was adopted. A single-party system was nevertheless introduced in 1982. However, five years later opposition candidates were allowed to stand in legislative elections on Grande Comore.